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ABSTRACT 
The Generation IV International Forum (GlF) emphasizes proliferation resistance and physical protection 
(PR&PP) as a main goal for future ~luclear encrgy systems. The GIF I'R&PI' Working Group has developed 
a methodology for the evaluation of  these systems. As an applicatiorl o f  the metl~odology, a Markov model 
has been developed for the evaluation o f  proliferation resistance and is demonstrated for a hypothetical 
Example Sodium Fast Reactor (ESFR) system. 'This paper presents tlie case o f  diversion by the facility 
owner/operator to obtaiu material that could be used in a nuclear weapon. The Markov model is applied to 
evaluate nlaterial diversion strategies. The following features o f  the Markov model are presented here: ( I )  
An effective detection rate has been introduced to accourlt for the itnplementation o f  multiple safeguards 
approacl~es at a give11 strategic point; ( 2 )  Technical failure to divert material is modeled as intrinsic barriers 
related to the design o f  the facility or the properties o f  the material in the facility; and ( 3 )  Conceal~ne~~t to 
defeat or degrade the performance o f  safeguards is recognized in the Markov model. Three proliferation risk 
~neasures are calculated directly by tlie Markov model: tlie detection probability, technical failure probability, 
asid proliferation time. The material type is indicated by an index that is based on the quality o f  niaterial 
diverted. Sensitivity cases have bee11 done to demonstrate the effects o f  different modeling features on tlie 
measures o f  proliferation resistance. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Generation IV Inter~~ational Forum (GIF) emphasizes proliferation resistance and physical protection 
(PR&PP) as a maill goal for future nuclear energy systems. The PR&I'l' Working Group o f  GIF has 
developed a pathway based ~nethodology for the evaluation o f  these systems [ l ] .  As  an application o f  the 
methodology, a Markov model imple~ne~~tatio~l o f  the methodology has been developed for the evaluatiou o f  
the PR&PP characteristics [2] and detno~lstrated for different nuclear energy systems atid scenarios [Z-51. 
The Markov process consists o f  a set o f  random variables whose future and past states are independent given 
the present states. The possible values o f  these ra~idom variables constitute the slate space. Markov processes 
are usually described by a directed graph, with edges characterized by transition parameters from one state to 
another state. Therefore, thc Markov approach is a suitable tool for pathway analysis for PR&PP cvaluation. 
The paper is organized as follows: the next section briefly discusses an adaptation o f  the Markov approach to 
the proliferation study, the system features that are expected to have significant impacts on Markov model 
parameters and need to be considered and proliferatio11 resistance measures that can be calculated. Major 
system elements including elements o f  the ESFR recycle facility are identified in the third section. Material 
flows aud stocks atid a Markov model o f  the entire ESFR system are also shown in the section. In the fourth 
section, diversion scenarios associated with individual system elements o f  the ESFR system are evaluated by 
calculating both probabilistic and deterministic proliferation sesistancc measures. Proliferation success 
probabilities o f  diversion scenarios are graphically presented using a bar diagram. Conclusions and future 
work are discussed in the last section. 
ADAPTING THE MARKOV MODEL AI'I'ROACII TO TIIE I'ROLIFERATION IZESISTANCE 
STUDY 
In applying tlie Markov approach to the proliferation study of  nuclear encrgy systems, thc normal flow of 
nuclear material in the fuel cycle (e.g., frolit and back ends) are accounted for and the abnormal flow due to 
proliferation activities are modeled as a time dependent random process. Major activity modules in the fuel 
cycle (e.g., a physical process in a recycle facility) and the proliferation pathway (e.g., the act of diversion 
from a declared facility) are represented by a number of discrete stages in the Markov chain. In addition, 
absorbing states (terminal stages) are used to represent the effective termination of the proliferation activity 
due to intrinsic (e.g., radiation) or extrinsic (e.g., international safeguards) barriers. The transition between 
stages is treated as a random process with a given probability distribution. The transition rate is characterizcd 
by time parameters that are based on physical processes. 
A Markov model of the nuclear energy system consists of a number of states with transitions characterized 
by time parameters that are physically meaningful. Therefore, all the features of the system that have impacts 
on transition parameters of tlie Markov model should be considered accordingly. Effectively, the modeled 
features affect thc dynamic properties of the Markov model. In particular the following features have been 
included in the Markov model: 
1) An effective detection rate is introduced to account for ihe implementation of multiple safeguards 
approaches at a given strategic point. Uncertainties related to the accuracylsensitivity of measurement 
methods are also considered in the model. The potential for false alarm due to over-sensitivity of 
safeguards equipment is accounted for by a parameter, the confidence level of diversion confirmation; 
2) A state called "diversion failure" is introduced to reflect the inability of the proliferator to overcome the 
intrinsic barriers originated from cither the design of the facility or the properties of the material in the 
facility; 
3) Concealment to defeat or degrade the performance of safeguards is implemented in the Markov model. It 
is considered as a tactic of the proliferator and is assumed to prompt more immediate and concerted 
responses from the safeguards inspectors; 
4) Human performance in the safeguards area is incorporated in the Markov model by modifying the time 
parameter of a human action (e.g. the transition time associated with an inspection) with a success factor 
that takes into consideration the probability of human errors. 
Details of lnathematically formulating extrinsic barriers, intrinsic barricrs, concealment, and human factors 
have been discussed in [2] and will not be discussed further in this paper. Example studies have bccn done to 
demonstrate the effects of different features on the PR measures for the fuel facility of the ESFR system [2- 
51. Sensitivity cases have bccn done to demonstrate the effects of different modeling features on the 
measures of proliferation resistance. 
Of the six PR measures [ I ]  developed by the PR&PP Working Group, two probabilistic measures are 
calculated directly by the Markov model and they are the detection probability (DP) and failure probability 
that is used as a metric of technical difficulty (TF). Since the Markov model reflects the material flows and 
stocks inside a nuclear energy system, proliferation time (PT), a third PR measure, can also be calculated 
given a diversion rate. The material type (MT) is the fourth PR measure, which can be represented by an 
index based on the quality (physical and chemical composition) of material diverted. The material type also 
directly affects the proliferation cost (PC) and detection resomces efficiency (DE); therefore, it is also used 
to represent these two PR measures. 
TIIE MARKOV MODEL FOR PROLIFERATiON STUDY OF THE ESFR SYSTEM 
In this study, a hypothetical Example Sodiuin Fast Reactor (ESFR) system [I] is sclccted for exercising the 
Markov model approach that impletnents thc PR&PP evaluation methodology. 
'The ESFR system includes four sodium-cooled 300 MWe rcactors, fuel cycle facilities, and a deployment 
scenario, i t . ,  a co-location of tlie fuel cycle facility close to four reactor units [I]. The site also contains a 
spent fuel stagiug area used for washing spent fucl assemblies and transferring them to the fuel cycle facility. 
'The fresh fuel is also transferred to the reactors via the staging area. In addition, a spent fuel storage area is 
provided for transfers from and to reactors. An external source of heavy metal makeup is required for the 
recycle facilities. It is assurncd the external source of makeup is provided in the forin of LWR spent fuel 
assemblies. 
The recycling elements, which are the key elements ofthe ESFR system, are shown in Figure 1 togcther with 
the material flows. Also, some of the safeguards approaches associated with each element are sketched in 
Figure 1. Figure 2 is the Markov model of the overall ESFR system. 'The material flows of the ESFR system 
can be tracked from Figure 2, as the Markov model is created based on the flows inside the system. Details 
of fuel storage, transfer, and reactors can be found in [I, 21. 
Fresh Fuel Spent Fuel A ~ ~ e m b l y  
136 assembl~eslyr 136 assemblleslyr -- Hardware 
- 11960 kg-HMlyr - lo950 kg-HMlyr Waste 
(-3000 kg TRU) (-2680 kg TRU) MBA-f 
Figure 1: ESFR Recycling Elements and Related Safeguards 
The role of the LWR related elements in Figure 2 is to provide external makeup source of TRU and U 
product to the element "Product Preparation." In Figure 2, Recycle Elements I and I1 reprocess the spent fuel 
to produce the mixed TRU and U fresh fuel that will be shipped back to the ESFR reactor (not shown in 
Figure 2). Recycle Element 11-1.1 is simplified to provide external sources of U and TRU only. Recycle 
Element 11-1.2 is actually the element "Disassembly" and it disassembles the ESFR spent fuel assemblies. 
Recycle Element I processes the bulk spent fuel electrochemically and produces the TRU and U, which will 
be used to fabricate fresh fuel pins and assemblies in Rccycle Element 11-2. liccycle Element I contains more 
elements, i.e., chopping, electro-refiner, U-product processing, TRU extraction, and product preparation, as 
shown in Figure 1. The new fuel (fresh fuel for the fast reactors) will be shipped from Recycle Element 11-2 
to the "SF & NF Storage Cell" (not shown in Figure 2). The waste output is not included in Figure 2. 
Elcctro-rcfiner 
TRU Extraction 
I 
From Figure 1, each year the inputs include 136 ESFR spent hlel assemblies (-1 0,950 kg-'IM containing 
about 2,680 kg TRU) to elcment "Disassembly" and external sources of 760 kg uranium metal and 325 kg 
'TRIJ metal to element "Product Preparation". The salt will he built-up during the reprocessing of chopped 
ESFR SF pins. The output of the ESFR slice is the 136 ESFR fresh fuel assemblies (-1 1,960 kg-I-IM 
containing about 3,000 kg TRU) per year. Some other material flow includcs sampling at different elements 
and salt and clad processing. 
Material balance areas are defined in both Figures 1 and 2. Strategic points including KMPs and the 
associated safeguards approachcs can be established between two stages along the ESFR material flow 
diagram. Some of the safeguards are defined Figure I .  A morc detailed description safeguards assigncd to 
individual system elements can be found in [2]. 
The Markov model of the ESFR system shown in Figure 2 is illustrated in terms of a diversion. Potential 
paths for diversion are represented in dashed lines in Figure 2. It is assumed that a PUREX-like undeclared 
system element exists and reprocesses the diverted material by extracting pure plutonium and converting it 
into metal. There are five different types of states in the Markov model. The normal state indicates the 
normal operation of either a declared element or an uttdeclared element. The state of "Being Detected" 
indicates the detection of a diversion using the safeguards approaches. The state of "Diversion Failure" 
represents the failure of a diversion because the proliferator is not capable of overcoming the intrinsic 
barriers. Even after successful diversion of material into the undeclared elements, the proliferator may still 
fail and end up with the state of "Technical Failure" due to technical difficulties in the processing of the 
diverted material. The state of "Success" can be reached only if the proliferator overcomes all the safeguards, 
intrinsic barriers, and technical difficulties. States of "Being Detected", "Diversion Failure", and "Technical 
Failure" are all absorbing states, i.e., the diversion is over once the diversion is detected, or failed due to 
intrinsic barriers, or failed due to technical difficulties. 
Given the initial status, the Markov model is characterized by a set of differential equations and can be 
solved numerically to obtain the states at any time. A Matlab-based soitware PRCALC has been developed 
to automatically create the Markov model that rcpresents a spccific scenario of an energy system and solve 
for both probabilistic and deterministic PR measures. 
DIVERSION SCENARIOS OF THE ESFR SYSTEM 
In this study, we evaluate PK measures of each ESFK system element by assuming that diversion occurs at 
only one system element at a time. It is assumed that diversion rates at different stages are all the same 
(20) 121. The PR measures are computed using the PRCALC for each system elcment and the results are 
summarized in Table 1. 
Columns 2 and 3 in Table 1 show the probal>ilitics of detection (DP) and failure (PF) at the end of 
proliferation time (PT), which includcs both the times to divert and reprocess I SQ equivalent of Pu. Note 
that we use PF as a mctric for the PR measure technical difficulty (TD) here. The material type column 
shows the MT value of material at each clcment. The MT values are calculated based on the physical forms 
and chcmical compositions of material, as shown in 121. Columns 6 and 7 give the numcrical values of 1'R 
mcasures proliferation cost (PC) and detection resources efficieucy (DE), which are basically the same as the 
MT values, as discussed in [2]. Larger PR measure values indicate that elements are more proliferation 
resistant. In Table I ,  PS in column 8 rcpresents proliferation success probability, which is not one of the PR 
measures. PS can be calculated directly from the Markov rnodel of ESFR system. Finally, major safeguards 
for each stage are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 : Detection and 
Stage 
-. 
1: LWR SF 
I: Storage Basket for 
Frcsh Fuel 
11: 'Transfer Port 
I: -. ESFR R & O ~  
111: Transfer 
-. 
=storage Basket 
for Spent Fuel 
IV: Transfer Port 
V: Transfer 
VI: StagindWashing 
Area 
VI1:TransferPort 
. 
VIII: Transfer 
IX: SF & NF 
Storage Cell 
X: Transfer Port 
XI: Transfer 
. 
X11: Recycle 
Elements 11-1.1 
ESFR SF 
Disassemblv 
Chopping 
Electro-refiner 
U-product 
0.41 0.058 0.3 23 
1B, IE, 2F 
. . IE, IF, 1G 
pin-Fabrication 0.93 0.027 0.4 30.1 0.4 0.4 0.013 3.4, 3D, 3E, 
2A, 2F 
0.96 0.028 0.4 30.1 0.4 0.4 0.014 3A, 3D,3E, 
2A, 2F 
Success 
DP 
0.96 
0.45 
0.98 
0.69 
0.98 
0 . 3 1 . 0 6  
0.44 
0.41 
0.43 
0.55 
0.53 
0.63 
.- 
0.57 
0.59 
0.98 
0.68 
0.78 
0.72 
0.72 
Probability 
PF 
0.038.- 
0.039 
0.013 
0.048 
0.013 
0.1 14.' 
0.054 
0.055 
0.14 
0.069 
0.16 
0.037 
0.033 
0.007 
0.023 
0.018 
0.105 
0.018 
- for Each - 
MT PT 
0.4 292 
0.4 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
= 
0.5 
0.5 
-- 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.7 
0.7 
Stage 
PC 
0.4 
.- 
0.4 
0.5 
0.7 
0.5 
F5 
. 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.7 
0.7 
30.1 
146 
60.2 
146 
60.2 
22.6 
45.2 
45.2 
22.6 
45.2 
22.6 
30.1 
30.1 
136.7 
30.1 
30.1 
22 
500 
PS 
0.003 
0.018 
0.007 
0.0039 
0.0066 
0.0046 
0.017 
0.009 
0.0089 
0.022 
0.011 
0.027 
0.0185 
0.017 
0.004 
0.011 
0.009 
0.017 
0.003 
DE 
0.4 
0.4 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
- 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
0.7 
0.7 
Major 
Safeguards 
3A, 1B, IE, IF, 
4B, 4C 
IB, ID, IG, 
2A, 
3A, IB, lE, IF, 
4B, 4C 
113, ID,  IG,  I H  
-G, IB, IE, IF, 
4B, 4C 
3.4, IB, lE, IF, 
4B, 4C 
3A, 113; IE, IF, 
4B, 4C 
3A, lB, IE, IF, 
4B, 4C 
3.4, IB, IE, IF, 
4B, 4C 
3A, lB , IE , lF ,  
4B,4C 
3A, IB, IE, IF, 
4B,4C 
3A, IB, IE, IF, 
4B, 4C 
3 ~ ,  lB, 1E, IF, 
4B, 4C 
3A, IB, IE, IF, 
4B, 4C 
3A, IB, IE, IF, 
4B, 4C 
IF, 2A, 3A, 
3D, 4B 
ID, lD, 1E, 
3A, 3D, 3E 
3.4, 3D, 3E 
3A, 3D,3E 
As noted above, probability of proliferation success is not one of the 1'11 measures but it certainly reflects 
proliferation resistance of the corresponding element with assumed safeguards and intrinsic barriers. The 
comparison between proliferation success probabilities can tell where safeguards andlor intrinsic barriers 
should be strengthened to make it more proliferation resistant. A bar diagram representation of the 
proliferation success probabilities at each system element defined in Table 1 is shown in Figure 3. 
Assesstnent of proliferation resistance sl~ould not rely solely on one or sorne of measures, e.g., proliferation 
detection probability or failure probability (technical difficulty). Other measures sllown in Table 1 should 
also play important roles in the PR evaluation of individual I7,SFR recycle elements. For the U-product 
Processing clement, extremely long diversion time and unatfractive material type make it also very 
proliferation resistant. The TRU Extraction element is less proliferation resistant because the material it 
contains is TRU metal, which is very attractive. In addition, the diversion time is very short and proliferation 
cost is low. It is also expected that more resources should be spent on detection due to the fact that the 
material is more attractive to a potential prolifcrator and the detection will be expensive. 
Figure 3: Bar Diagatn Representation of Diversion Success Probabilities at ESFR System Elements 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Using the Markov model approach, PK measures as well as  success probabilities of diversion at individual 
ESFR system elements are computcd. The results reflect PR characteristics of syslem elements and can 
provide useful information to system designers and to program policy makers. 
'The Markov model approach is highly adaptable and scaleable. It has been applied previously to evaluate 
both the PR&PP characteristics of various nuclear energy systems and different threats posed to these 
systems including misuse, diversion, theft, and sabotage, as  presented in [2-51. 
It is recognized that modeling impacts of these relevant features in a precise manner is very difficult. In the 
Markov modeling of nuclear energy systems, mathematical representations of these features can be 
formulated such that at least the trend of the corresponding impacts and the boundary conditions ofthe 
impacts, i.e., with and without a specific feature, can be captured using the introduced. Therefore, the 
nutnbers and conclusions presented here should not be taken as absolute predictions. Instead, these are 
considered as outcomes ofthe assumptions used in the Markov models. 'nie Markov models and parameters 
in this study are both preliminary. The models need to be refined and parameters need to be further 
developed and validated. 
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